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IN THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
MARJORIE LOIS ELLMAKER,
a single woman,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
CALVIN TABOR and KEITH TURNER
and A 1 REAL ESTATE, an Idaho
Limited Liability Company,
Defendants/Respondents

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District
for Canyon County.
Honorable George A Southworth, District Judge
Kenneth F. Stringfield
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho, for Appellant.
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David E. Kerrick
Residing at Caldwell, Idaho, for Respondent.
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I.
THE AFFIDAVITS, DEPOSITION TESTIMONY, AND NUMBEROUS ATTACHED
DOCUMENTS ARE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT MARJORIE ELLMAKER'S CLAIMS
AND CREATE MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT.
A. Legal Standards for Summary Judgment.
The trial court failed to follow the legal standards when it granted Calvin Tabor's
motion for summary judgment. The trial court must construe "disputed facts ... in favor of
the non-moving party [Marjorie Ellmaker]," and resolve "all reasonable inferences that
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can be drawn from the record ... in favor of the non-moving party." Curlee v. Kootenai

Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 394 (2008). A court must deny a summary
judgment motion if reasonable people might draw conflicting inferences and conclusions
from the evidence. Pro lndiviso v. Mid-Mile Holding, 131 Idaho 741, 745 ( 1998);

Farmers National Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 67-68 (1994). The trial court cannot
weigh evidence or resolve controverted factual issues. Am. Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105
Idaho 600, 601 (1983).

8. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient Evidence of Her Standing to Withstand
Summary Judgment and Dismissal.
Marjorie had legal standing to bring this suit. The trial court determined that it
would not consider Martha's will as evidence of her devise to Marjorie under I.C. § 15-3102. Although admission of the will to show a devise is permissive, the trial court
reasoned that (1) there was no explanation why it was not probated, and (2) the court
could not determine that it was Martha's last will. Mr. Tabor adopted the trial court's
reasoning in his brief. Mr. Tabor's brief addressed the application of I.C. § 15-3-102 and

If

I.C. § 15-3-108, but failed to address Marjorie's other standing arguments; therefore,

I
I

she assumes that Mr. Tabor does not contest them.
Marjorie's October 22, 2013 affidavit stated that Steve Scanlin prepared Martha
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Chitwood's will. (R., pp. 137, 138.) Mr. Scanlin confirmed this in his October 22, 2013,
Affidavit. (R., pp. 103, 104.) The record contains no evidence that Martha made any
other will. Marjorie was present when Mr. Scanlin and Martha reviewed Exhibit B, and
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Martha affirmed that the will stated her intent. Mr. Tabor made no argument suggesting,
nor produced evidence of, any other will. A reasonable inference, based on Marjorie's
evidence, and applying the presumptions in favor of her, is that the will, Exhibit B, was
Martha's only will.
Mr. Scanlin's law practice focused on elder law including estate planning, wills,
and probates. Mr. Scanlin assisted (represented) Marjorie as Martha's personal
representative; he prepared Affidavits of Non-Probate to "transfer [the promissory note debt -at issue in this case] to Marjorie. Mr. Scanlin believed those documents effectively
transferred Martha's property to Marjorie. (The October 22, 2013 affidavits of Marjorie
and Mr. Scanlin.) It is reasonable to infer that Mr. Scanlin believed a probate was
unnecessary to transfer Martha's estate. It is a reasonable inference that Marjorie relied
on her lawyer's judgment, and did not need to probate the will to transfer Martha's
property.
The record shows that she met the requirements of the exception to I.C. § 15-3102; Marjorie possessed the property according to the will, and no one else had claimed
it since Martha's death. The record also shows that Marjorie was an heir under
intestacy. In granting Mr. Tabor's motion for summary judgment, the trial court failed to
make reasonable inferences in Marjorie's favor and therefore abused its discretion.

C. Count I -Oral Contract. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient Evidence of Mr.
Tabor's Oral Agreement to Withstand Summary Judgment and Dismissal.
Marjorie presented evidence that Mr. Tabor orally agreed that he would repay the
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 4

debt both before and after it was in default. However, the trial court found that there was
no consideration for any agreement by Tabor to repay the debt because Marjorie had
no valid claim against Tabor to forgo. Mr. Tabor argued that as a promiser, he cannot
be both guarantor and a principal debtor and there was neither consideration nor a
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writing. But, if Mr. Tabor received any benefit because Marjorie delayed bringing an
action against either him or A 1, then there was consideration. Mickelsen Construction,

Inc. v. Horrocks, 154 Idaho 396 (2013) quoting Vincent v. Larson, 1 Idaho 241, 248
(1869) ("It would seem that any gain to the promiser, or loss to the promisee, however
trifling, ought to be sufficient consideration to support an express promise") (emphasis
added). Mr. Tabor's arguments ignore the exceptions to the parol evidence rule, and his
oral agreement to pay the loan is an original agreement not governed by the statute of
frauds.
The trial court was mistaken when it determined that Marjorie had no valid claim
to give up, or it was presuming that there was no claim because Marjorie had no
standing. Marjorie's valid claims against Mr. Tabor, Mr. Turner, A1, or any combination
of them included: (1) mistake, misrepresentation or fraud, reformation, rescission, or
unjust enrichment; or at least (2) enforcement of valid agreements between A 1, or all of
the defendants, and Martha (and later Marjorie). Marjorie could have filed a lien against
the sold McCall property to the extent of the loan and A 1's interest in it. Had Marjorie
filed a lawsuit, then A 1 and the partners' assets would have been negatively affected.
One of the reasons that she did not file the suit then was because she did not
understand that Mr. Tabor had misled her and taken advantage of the close personal
relationship he had developed with Martha and Marjorie. The size of the loan, its terms
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- including not keeping a security interest in the property until the loan was paid, its
changing due dates, and that Mr. Tabor knew he could not get a loan like this from a
bank, are a few of the facts demonstrating the degree of trust that Mr. Tabor developed
with Martha and Marjorie. By not filing suit earlier because of Mr. Tabor's promises to
pay, A 1, Mr. Tabor and Mr. Turner gained a "trifling" benefit. This benefit was sufficient
consideration to Mr. Tabor even assuming the loans were to A 1.
Mr. Tabor's promises to Marjorie to pay the loan are original promises and an
exception to the Statute of Frauds. I.C. § 9-506. If the debt was A1's, Mr. Tabor's
promises to pay it, combined with the consideration that he received from Marjorie are
covered by I.C. § 9-506(2) & (3). Whether an oral promise constitutes a collateral or an
original obligation, for the purposes of the statute of frauds, is generally a question for
the finder of fact. Dalby v. Kennedy, 94 Idaho 72 (1971 ). See also, Wright v. Wright, 97
Idaho 439 (1976). Marjorie stated under oath, that both before and after the note was in
default, Mr. Tabor orally agreed that he was responsible for the debt and would pay it.
Whether Mr. Tabor agreed to pay the debt creates an issue of material fact. For
these reasons, the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on Count I.

D. Count II - Good Faith and Fair Dealing. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient
Evidence that Mr. Tabor Failed to Act in Good Faith and Fair Dealing to
Withstand Summary Judgment and Dismissal.
Mr. Tabor failed to act in good faith and fairly both before and after entering into
the loan agreement. The state court ruled that Marjorie's Count II claim that Tabor
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing (covenant of good faith) was
only based on Tabor's "fraud or undue influence" in the formation of the Note. While that
was part of Marjorie's claim, the claim was also based on Mr. Tabor's actions as a LLC
member/manager.
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF - 6
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After the loan was due, including after A 1 had been administratively dissolved,
Mr. Tabor represented to Marjorie that he - not A 1 was responsible for and would repay
the loan. Because of Mr. Tabor's representations, Marjorie delayed her collection action.
(R., pp. 189, 190.) Because of the delay, the assets of A1 that secured the loan no
longer existed. "The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a covenant
implied by law in the parties' contract." Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134
Idaho 738, 750 (2000) (other citations omitted). "The covenant requires that the parties
perform, in good faith, the obligations imposed by their agreement. ... " Id. If he was not
responsible for the loan because it was to A 1, then Mr. Tabor was obligated to let
Marjorie know before he did in the fall of 2009. A person's duty to speak to prevent
harm to another was raised in James v. Mercea, 152 Idaho 914, 918 (2012)(quoting G
& M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 521 (1991)). The Court identified that

this duty arises,
(1) if there is a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and
confidence between the two parties; (2) in order to prevent a partial
statement of the facts from being misleading; or (3) if a fact known
by one party and not the other is so vital that if the mistake were
mutual the contract would be voidable, and the party knowing the
fact also knows that the other does not know it.
If Mr. Tabor was not responsible for the debt, he had a duty to refrain from saying that
he was.
As a LLC member/manager, Mr. Tabor also failed to act in good faith good faith
to repay the loan. Instead, he allowed A1 to loan money for non-business purposes and
appears to have distributed A 1 assets (that secured the loan), to himself after the loan
was in default. Marjorie has not claimed that Mr. Tabor is liable for the debt "solely by
reason of the member acting as a member or manager acting as a manager." Mr.
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 7
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Tabor, a businessman experienced LLC formation and dissolution, was obliged to "wind
up" A1 affairs once it was administratively dissolved. I.C. § 53-642. 1 Once A1
administratively dissolved, Mr. Tabor could" ... not carry on any [A 1) business except
that necessary to wind up and liquidate its business and affairs under section 53-644,
Idaho Code, and notify claimants under sections 53-648 and 53-649, Idaho Code." I.C.

§ 53-643B. Winding up required Mr. Tabor to make sure that he used A1's assets to pay
back A1's creditors - particularly creditors whose loans were secured by A1 assets. I.C.
§ 53-646.
Mr. Tabor claimed that they did not wind up A1 because of its debt- implying
that A 1 did not have assets for its creditors. Mr. Tabor also claimed that he was an A 1
creditor and that payments to him as a creditor were not included in distributions. There
are two problems with this argument. First, I.C. § 53-646 sets out the post
"administrative dissolution" priority of distribution of assets to creditors; it required the
assets be distributed to creditors like Marjorie. Second, A 1's tax documents show that
he took the money as a distribution, not as compensation for services. The tax
documents appear to show that A 1 had assets that could have been used to repay at
least part of its debt. Mr. Tabor and Mr. Turner could have made sure that the money
went to Marjorie in and attempt to fulfill their good faith obligations. Instead they appear
to have claimed the assets for themselves; and after the dissolution, Mr. Tabor made
statements assuring Marjorie that he would repay the loan.
In any event, Marjorie placed sufficient evidence in the record that had the trial

Mr. Tabor's brief cites the newer statute for authority. However, the statute in place
during the formation and administrative dissolution was the older Title 53, Chapter 6.
1
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court made all reasonable inferences in her favor, it would have found issues of fact and
not granted Mr. Tabor's motion for summary judgment on Count II.

E. Count Ill - Promissory Note. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient Evidence
that Mr. Tabor was Liable under Agency Doctrines to Withstand Summary
Judgment and Dismissal.
The trial court statement of reasons for dismissing Marjorie's Count Ill claim
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show that the court failed to weigh the facts in favor of the non-moving party. The trial
court stated the promissory note was clearly and unambiguously entered into between
A 1 Real Estate and Martha and that "there is no evidence that Martha was misled in any
way." Mr. Tabor adopts the court's statements. The problem with the court's statement
is found in Marjorie's affidavits that were available to the trial court. In her October 22,
2013 affidavit, Marjorie stated that Mr. Tabor misled Martha (and Marjorie) and that,
based on what he told them, they believed the loan was to Mr. Tabor. Her affidavit also
sets out Mr. Tabor's statements after the loan was made, consistent with her allegation
that he misled them. Moreover, the trial court appears to have failed to consider the
potential effects and legal significance of Mr. Tabor's misrepresentations as an agent,
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I

member, and manager of A 1.
Mr. Tabor argues that the four corners of the documents show the agreement.
Marjorie agrees that the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Notes are in the name
of A 1 Real Estate LLC. But points out that there is an ambiguity whether the note is
secured. The purchase and sale agreement says that the loan is secured by the assets
of A 1 Real Estate: the note does not mention security: and the closing documents say
that it is unsecured. Idaho law allows parol evidence in a case where misrepresentation
is alleged, to show "representations by one party were a material part of the bargain."
Aspiazu v. Morlimer, 139 Idaho 548 (2003) quoting, Thomas v. Campbell, 107 Idaho
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - 9
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398,402 (1984). Parol evidence is also admissible in cases alleging "'mutual mistake or
other matters which render a contract void or voidable."' Gillespie v. Mountain Park
Estates, LLC, 138 Idaho 27, 30 (2002) quoting Mikesell v. Newworld Development
Corp., 122 Idaho 868, 876 (Ct.App.1992). Therefore, even though Mr. Tabor correctly
cites the law regarding the usual interpretation of contracts, the impact of an integration
clause, and the admissibility of parol evidence to interpret a contract, he incorrectly
applies it to the facts of this case.
Mr. Tabor was A1's agent and member/manager when he negotiated the loan
with Martha and Marjorie. The trial court should have considered Mr. Tabor's pre-loan
statements to Martha and Marjorie about who the loan was to, and his later
representations to Marjorie that he was responsible to repay the debt as: (1) evidence
that Mr. Tabor caused Martha and Marjorie to be mistaken about a material term of the
agreement; (2) consistent with his course of conduct;2 and (3) evidence that he misled
Martha and Marjorie. Mr. Tabor's representations and omissions were particularly
influential because of the amount of trust that Martha and Marjorie had in him. Even
though the Purchase and Sale Agreement and the Note show the borrower was A1
Real Estate LLC, Mr. Tabor has the burden to show that he adequately disclosed A1
because of his statements to and relationship with Martha and Marjorie. See James v.
Mercea, Supra. They knew that Mr. Tabor was acting for a principal; but they did not
know what principal. Restatement (Second) of Agency§ 321 (1957); Keller Lorenz Co.
v. Insurance Assoc. Corp., 98 Idaho 678 (1977) (citing Restatement (Second) of Agency

Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 719 (Ct. App.1983) ("fact of agreement may be implied from
a course of conduct in accordance with its existence and assent.")
2
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§ 4(2) (1957), the plaintiff knew the defendant was acting as agent for some principal,
but did not know which principal); see also, Western Seeds, Inc. v. Bartu, 109 Idaho 70
(Ct.App.1985). How can Mr. Tabor's listing of A1 as the borrower on a single document
that he drafted have been an adequate disclosure of its identity, where Martha and
Marjorie could not distinguish between the two entities (Mr. Tabor and A1), when they
did not know, of, or the significance of, limited liability companies?
Marjorie put facts in the record that showed Mr. Tabor failed to make sure that
they knew the significance of dealing with A 1. To them, A 1 was just a name for Mr.
Tabor and his partner's business; it was not a separate principal (entity). Therefore
under agency principles, Mr. Tabor is personally liable on the note even if it is in A 1's
name.

F. Count IV - Unjust Enrichment. Marjorie Ellmaker Presented Sufficient
Evidence that Mr. Tabor Received a Benefit and is Liable under Unjust
Enrichment Withstand Summary Judgment and Dismissal.
Calvin Tabor was enriched in two ways when he received and failed to repay the
loan from Martha Chitwood. First, his business, A 1, was able to use the $150,000.00 for

I
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its benefit. Secondly, he took distributions in cash and other assets from A 1 after he
obtained the loan. The trial court appears to have ruled that Mr. Tabor did not receive a
benefit because A 1 dissolved due to being insolvent. But, the elements of unjust
enrichment do not only apply if A 1 was solvent at the time that it was administratively
dissolved. Mr. Tabor argues that Marjorie's Count IV claim is outside of the statute of
limitations for bringing an action against him involving distributions of A 1's assets to him
according to I.C. § 30-6-406, Liability for Improper Distributions. Mr. Tabor misapplies
the statute.
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Mr. Tabor argued that Marjorie's unjust enrichment claim is time barred.
However, the statute that he relied on was not in place at the time of the distribution.
But, even if the statute applies to the time period and distribution, it does not apply in
this case. The statute appears in Title 30, Chapter 6, Part 4; this part governs the
"Relations of Members to Each Other and to Limited Liability Company." It applies to an
action by a member or the company, against another member, not to an action by a
third party against a member. In this case, the statute would apply between Mr. Tabor
and Mr. Turner. For example, Mr. Tabor could bring a claim against Mr. Turner under
this section if A 1 was unable to pay back its loan to Martha when it became due in
December 2007, because Mr. Turner had taken distributions in violation of I.C. § 30-6405 and 30-6-409. That is not the case here. Neither Martha nor Marjorie were
members of A 1 so the statute's time limits to bring a suit do not apply. Presumably, the
time limit applies against members, because as company insiders they are in a position
to know quickly whether (1) distributions have been made, and (2) whether the LLC is
unable to pay its debts as they become due. An outsider would not necessarily have
that information. Finally, it seems incongruent that a member who wrongfully took a
distribution, could defeat a creditor's claim by claiming it is time barred under this
statute, where I.C. § 30-6-704 "Other Claims Against Dissolved Limited Liability
Company" establishes a five (5) year limitation on actions for claimant against a
member who received distributed assets after dissolution. A 1 could have resolved any
of its creditors' claims by filing an article of dissolution and notifying its creditors of the
dissolution.
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benefit under, at best for him, questionable circumstances; no doubt, he appreciated the
benefit when he took a distribution after the loan was in default. Mr. Tabor does not
claim that he did not receive a benefit from the loan. And, based on the circumstances
alleged and placed before the court in Marjorie's affidavits, the evidence demonstrates
that it would be unjust for him to retain the benefit without paying back the loan. The trial
court erred by failing to construe the evidence in favor of Marjorie and by finding that
there were no issues of fact as to Count

II.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Marjorie L. Ellmaker respectfully asks the Court to
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Calvin Tabor.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~ y of September, 2014
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
THE UNDERSIGNED HEREBY CERTIFIES That a true and correct copy of the
above was hand delivered to:
David E. Kerrick
Attorney for Respondent
1001 Blaine St.
Caldwell, Idaho 83605

DATED: September 15, 2014.
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